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Abstract - We study the following problem: A data distributor has given sensitive data to a set of supposedly trusted 
agents (third parties). Some of the data are leaked and bring into being in an unconstitutional place (e.g., on the web or 
somebody’s laptop). The distributor must evaluate the likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more agents, as 
opposed to having been independently gathered by other means. We propose data distribution strategies (across the 
agents) that improve the likelihood of identifying leakages. These methods do not rely on alterations of the released data 
(e.g., watermarks). In some cases, we can also inject “realistic but replica” data records to further improve our chances of 
detecting leakage and identifying the guilty party.  
In the course of doing business, sometimes sensitive data must be handed over to supposedly trusted third 
parties. For example, a hospital may give patient records to Researchers who will devise new treatments. Similarly, a 
company may have partnerships with other companies that require sharing customer data. Another enterprise may 
outsource its data processing, so data must be given to various other companies. There always remains a risk of data 
getting leaked from the agent.  
Perturbation is a very valuable technique where the data are modified and made “less sensitive” before being 
handed to agents. For example, one can add random noise to certain attributes, or one can replace exact values by 
ranges. But this technique requires modification of data. Leakage detection is handled by watermarking, e.g., a unique 
code is implanted in each distributed copy. If that copy is later discovered in the hands of an unconstitutional party, the 
leaker can be identified. But again it requires code modification. Watermarks can sometimes be destroyed if the data 
recipient is malicious. 
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Abstract - We study the following problem: A data distributor 
has given sensitive data to a set of supposedly trusted agents 
(third parties). Some of the data are leaked and bring into 
being in an unconstitutional place (e.g., on the web or 
somebody’s laptop). The distributor must evaluate the 
likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more agents, 
as opposed to having been independently gathered by other 
means. We propose data distribution strategies (across the 
agents) that improve the likelihood of identifying leakages. 
These methods do not rely on alterations of the released data 
(e.g., watermarks). In some cases, we can also inject “realistic 
but replica” data records to further improve our chances of 
detecting leakage and identifying the guilty party. 
In the course of doing business, sometimes sensitive 
data must be handed over to supposedly trusted third parties. 
For example, a hospital may give patient records to 
Researchers who will devise new treatments. Similarly, a 
company may have partnerships with other companies that 
require sharing customer data. Another enterprise may 
outsource its data processing, so data must be given to 
various other companies. There always remains a risk of data 
getting leaked from the agent. 
Perturbation is a very valuable technique where the 
data are modified and made “less sensitive” before being 
handed to agents. For example, one can add random noise to 
certain attributes, or one can replace exact values by ranges. 
But this technique requires modification of data. Leakage 
detection is handled by watermarking, e.g., a unique code is 
implanted in each distributed copy. If that copy is later 
discovered in the hands of an unconstitutional party, the leaker 
can be identified. But again it requires code modification. 
Watermarks can sometimes be destroyed if the data recipient 
is malicious. 
Keywords : Allocation strategies, data leakage, data 
privacy, fake records, leakage model. 
I. Introduction 
n the course of doing business, sometimes sensitive 
data must be handed over to supposedly trusted third 
parties. For example, a hospital may give patient 
records to researchers who will devise new treatments. 
Similarly, a company may have partnerships with other 
companies that require sharing customer data. Another 
enterprise may outsource its data processing, so data 
must be given to various other companies. We call the 
owner of the data the distributor and the supposedly 
trusted third parties the agents. Our goal is to detect 
when the distributor’s sensitive data has been leaked by 
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agents, and if possible to identify the agent that leaked 
the data. 
We consider applications where the original 
sensitive data cannot be perturbed. Perturbation is a 
very useful technique where the data is modified and 
made “less sensitive” before being handed to agents. 
For example, one can add random noise to certain 
attributes, or one can replace exact values by ranges 
[18]. However, in some cases it is important not to alter 
the original distributor’s data. For example, if an 
outsourcer is doing our payroll, he must have the exact 
salary and customer bank account numbers. If medical 
researchers will be treating patients (as opposed to 
simply computing statistics), they may need accurate 
data for the patients. 
Traditionally, leakage detection is handled by 
watermarking, e.g., a unique code is embedded in each 
distributed copy. If that copy is later discovered in the 
hands of an unauthorized party, the leaker can be 
identified. Watermarks can be very useful in some 
cases, but again, involve some modification of the 
original data. Furthermore, watermarks can sometimes 
be destroyed if the data recipient is malicious. In this 
paper we study unobtrusive (Not attracting unnecessary 
attention) techniques for detecting leakage of a set of 
objects or records. Specifically, we study the following 
scenario: After giving a set of objects to agents, the 
distributor discovers some of those same objects in an 
unauthorized place. (For example, the data may be 
found on a web site, or may be obtained through a legal 
discovery process). 
At this point the distributor can assess the 
likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more 
agents, as opposed to having been independently 
gathered by other means. If the distributor sees “enough 
evidence” that an agent leaked data, he may stop doing 
business with him, or may initiate legal proceedings.
 
In this paper we develop a model for assessing 
the “guilt” of agents.
 
We also present algorithms for 
distributing Objects to agents, in a way that improves 
our chances of
 
identifying a leaker. Finally, we also 
consider the option of adding fake” objects to the 
distributed set. Such objects do not correspond to real 
entities but appear realistic to the agents. In a sense, the 
fake objects acts as a type of watermark for the entire 
set, without modifying any individual members. If it turns 
out an agent was given one or more fake objects that 
were leaked, then the distributor can be more confident 
that agent was guilty.
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II. Problem setup and notation 
Entities and Agents:  A  distributor owns a set  
T={t1, tm} of valuable data objects. The distributor 
wants to share some of the objects with a set of agents 
U1, U2, Un, but does not wish the objects be leaked to 
other third parties. The objects in T could be of any type 
and size, e.g., they could be tuples in a relation, or 
relations in a database. An agent Ui receives a subset of 
objects Ri equest 
or an explicit request: 
Sample request Ri = SAMPLE (T, mi): Any 
subset of Mi records from T can be given to Ui. 
Explicit request Ri = EXPLICIT (T, condi): Agent 
Ui receives all the T objects that satisfy condi. 
Type of data leakage: In order to implement the 
appropriate protective measures, we must first 
understand what we are protecting. Based on publicly 
disclosed Data Leakage breaches, the type of data 
leaked is broken down as follows: 
Type of information leaked Percentage 
Confidential information - 15% 
Intellectual property - 4% 
Customer data - 73% 
Health records - 8% 
Guilty Agents: Suppose that after giving objects 
to agents, the distributor discovers that a set S 
leaked. This means that some third party called the 
target has been caught in possession of S. For example, 
this target may be displaying S on its web site, or 
perhaps as part of a legal discovery process, the target 
turned over S to the distributor. 
Since the agents U1, Un has some of the data, 
it is reasonable to suspect them leaking the data. 
However, the agents can argue that they are innocent, 
and that the S data was obtained by the target through 
other means. 
For example, say one of the objects in S 
represents a customer X. Perhaps X is also a customer 
of some other company, and that company provided the 
data to the target. Or perhaps X can be reconstructed 
from various publicly Available sources on the web. 
Our goal is to estimate the likelihood that the 
leaked data came from the agents as opposed to other 
sources. Intuitively, the more data in S, the harder it is 
for the agents to argue they did not leak anything. 
Similarly, the rarer”  the objects, the harder it is to 
argue that the target obtained them through other 
means. For instance, if one of the S objects was only 
given to agent U1, while the other objects were given to 
all agents, we may suspect U1 more. The model we 
present next captures this intuition. 
We say an agent Ui is guilty and if it contributes 
one or more objects to the target. We denote the event 
that agent Ui is guilty as Gi and the event that agent Ui 
is guilty for a given leaked set S as Gi|S. Our next step 
is to estimate Pr {Gi|S}, i.e., the probability that agent 
Ui is guilty given evidence S. 
III. Related works 
The guilt detection approach we present is 
related to the data provenance problem [3]: (whether it 
is genuine or not problem) tracing the lineage of S 
objects implies essentially the detection of the guilty 
agents. Tutorial [4] provides a good overview on the 
research conducted in this field. Suggested solutions 
are domain specific, such as lineage tracing for data 
warehouses [5], and assume some prior knowledge on 
the way a data view is created out of data sources. 
Our problem formulation with objects and sets 
is more general and simplifies lineage tracing, since we 
do not consider any data transformation from Ri sets to 
S. As far as the data allocation strategies are 
concerned, our work is mostly relevant to watermarking 
that is used as a means of establishing original 
ownership of distributed objects. Watermarks were 
initially used in images [16], video [8] and audio data [6] 
whose digital representation includes considerable 
redundancy. Recently, [1], [17], [10], [7] and other 
works have also studied marks insertion to relational 
data. Our approach and watermarking are similar in the 
sense of providing agents with some kind of receiver-
identifying information. 
However, by its very nature, a watermark 
modifies the item being watermarked. If the object to be 
watermarked cannot be modified then a watermark 
cannot be inserted. In such cases methods that attach 
watermarks to the distributed data are not applicable. 
Finally, there are also lots of other works on 
mechanisms that allow only authorized users to access 
sensitive data through access control policies [9], [2]. 
Such approaches prevent in some sense data leakage 
by sharing information only with trusted parties. 
However, these policies are restrictive and may make it 
impossible to satisfy agents’ requests. 
IV. Agent guilt model 
To compute this Pr{Gi|S}, we need an estimate 
for the probability that values in S can be guessed”  by 
the target. For instance, say some of the objects in S are 
emails of individuals. We can conduct an experiment 
and ask a person with approximately the expertise and 
resources of the target to find the email of say 100 
individuals. If this person can find say 90 emails, then 
we can reasonably guess that the probability of finding 
one email is 0.9. On the other hand, if the objects in 
question are bank account numbers, the person may 
only discover say 20, leading to an estimate of 0.2. 
Probability pt is analogous to the probabilities used in 
designing fault-tolerant systems. That is, to estimate 
how likely it is that a system will be operational 
throughout a given period, we need the probabilities that 
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T, determined either by a sample r⊆
T has ⊆
“
“
individual components will or will not fail. A component 
failure in our case is the event that the target guesses an 
object of S. while we use the probability of guessing to 
identify agents that have leaked information. 
The component failure probabilities are 
estimated based on experiments, just as we propose to 
estimate the pt’s. Similarly, the component probabilities 
are usually conservative estimates, rather than exact 
numbers. For example, say we use a component failure 
probability that is higher than the actual probability, and 
we design our system to provide a desired high level of 
reliability. Then we will know that the actual system will 
have at least that level of reliability, but possibly higher. 
In the same way, if we use pt’s that are higher than the 
true values, we will know that the agents will be guilty 
with at least the computed probabilities. 
There are T={t1,t2,t3};R1={t1,t2};R2{t2,t3};S={t1,t2,t3} 
In this case, all three of the distributor’s objects 
have been leaked and appear in S. Let us first consider 
how the target may have obtained object t1, which was 
given to both agents. The target either guessed t1 or 
one of U1 or U2 leaked it. We know that the probability 
of the former event is p, so assuming that probability 
that each of the two agents leaked t1 is the same we 
have the following cases: 
• The target guessed t1 with probability p; 
• Agent U1 leaked t1 to S with probability (1 - p)/2; 
• Agent U2 leaked t1 to S with probability (1 -p)/2; 
Similarly, we find that agent U1 leaked t2 to S 
with Probability 1 - p since he is the only agent that has 
t2. Given these values, the probability that agent U1 is 
not Guilty, namely that U1 did not leak either object is:  
(1 -(1 -p)/2) -(1 -(1 - p));                              (1)  
And the probability that U1 is guilty is: 1 – Pr {G1} 
Note that if did not hold, our analysis would be 
more complex because we would need to consider joint 
events, e.g., the target guesses t1 and at the same time 
one or two agents leak the value. In our simplified 
analysis we say that an agent is not guilty when the 
object can be guessed, regardless of whether the agent 
leaked the value. Since we are ”not counting” instances 
when an agent leaks information, the Simplified analysis 
yields conservative values (smaller Probabilities). 
To simplify the formulas that we present in the 
rest of the paper, we assume that all T objects have the 
same pt, which we call p. Our equations can be easily 
generalized to diverse pt’s though they become 
cumbersome to display. Next, we make two 
assumptions regarding the relationship among the 
various leakage events. The first assumption simply 
states that an agent’s decision to leak an object is not 
related to other objects. In [14] we study
 
a scenario 
where the actions for different objects are related, and 
we study how our results are impacted by the different 
independence assumptions. 
 
 
The term provenance” in this assumption 
statement refers to the sources of a value t that appears 
in the leaked set. The Source can be any of the agents 
who have t in their sets or the target itself (guessing). To 
simply our formulas, the following assumption states 
that join events have a negligible probability. As we 
argue in the example below, this assumption gives us 
more conservative estimates for the guilt of agents, 
which is consistent with our goals. 
 
 
 A single agent     leaked t from its own     set.  
 The target guessed (or obtained through other 
means) t without the help of any of the n agents. 
In other words, for all
target guesses t and the events that agents 
leaks objects t are disjoint. Before we 
present the general formula for computing the 
probability Pr{Gi|S} that an agent Ui is guilty, we 
provide a simple example. Assume that the distributor 
set T, the agent sets R’s and the target set S are: 
T = {t1, t2, t3}, R1 = {t1, t2}, R2 = {t1, t3}, S = {t1, t2, t3}. 
In this case, all three of the distributor’s objects 
have been leaked and appear in S. Let us first consider 
how the target may have obtained object t1, which was 
given to both agents. From Assumption 2, the target 
either guessed t1 or one of U1 or U2 leaked it. We know 
that the probability of the former event is p, so assuming 
that probability that each of the two agents leaked t1 is 
the same we have the following cases: 
 The target guessed t1 with probability p; 
 Agent U1 leaked t1 to S with probability (1 . p)/2; 
 Agent U2 leaked t1 to S with probability (1 . p)/2; 
Similarly, we find that agent U1 leaked t2 to S 
with probability 1. p since he is the only agent that has 
t2. Given values, the probability U1 is guilty is:  
                                         (2) 
Note that if Assumption 2 did not hold, our 
analysis would be more complex because we would 
need to consider joint events, e.g., the target guesses t1 
and at the same time one or two agents leak the value. 
Since we are not counting” instances when an agent 
leaks information, the simplified analysis yields 
conservative values (smaller probabilities). In the 
general case (with our assumptions), to find the 
probability that an agent Ui is guilty given a set S, first 
we compute the probability that he leaks a single object 
t to S. To  compute  this  we  define  the  set  of  agents
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Pr {G1|S} = 1 − Pr {G¯1}.
Assumption 1 :For all t,t’ Є S such that t ≠ t’ the provenance 
of t is independent of the provenance of t’.
“
Assumption 2: An Object t Є S can only be obtained by 
the target in one of the two ways as follows:


Ui R i 
the event that the t Є S,
Ui(i=1……….n)



“
that have t in their data sets. Then
using Assumption 2 and known probability p, we have:  
Pr {some agent leaked t to S} = 1__  p.                      (3) 
Assuming that all agents that belong to Vt can 
leak t to S with equal probability and using Assumption 
2 we obtain: 
otherwise   (4) 
Given that agent Ui is guilty if he leaks at least 
one value to S, with Assumption 1 and Equation 4 we 
can compute the probability Pr {Gi|S} that agent Ui is 
guilty: 
                                   (5) 
 
Fake Objects: The distributor may be able to 
add fake objects to the distributed data in order to 
improve his effectiveness in detecting guilty agents. 
However, fake objects may impact the correctness of 
what agents do, so they may not always be allowable. 
Perturbed, e.g., by adding random noise to sensitive 
salaries, or adding a watermark to an image. In our 
case, we are perturbing the set of distributor objects by 
adding fake elements. In some applications, fake 
objects may cause fewer problems that perturbing real 
objects.  
V. Future enhancements 
In this paper we are using multiple agents, for 
the purpose of security at the same time we are creating 
database for separate user, so through this we are 
strictly find out who is leaked information in internet.  
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Pr {Ui leaked t to S} = {1-P|Vt| , if Ui ∈ Vt, 0,
Pr {Gi|S} = 1− ∏  ( 1- 1-P|Vt| ) 
                    t∈S∩Ri
Vt = {Ui|t ∈ Ri}
−
